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Britain established in 1940 the first national nuclear weapons program in the 
world, and this gave Britain credibility in participating in the U.S.-led Manhattan 
Project during World War II. Despite the interruption in U.S.-U.K. nuclear 
cooperation in 1946-1958 owing to the McMahon Act, since 1958 the United 
States and the United Kingdom have worked closely in the nuclear domain. 
Indeed, since the 1962 Nassau Summit, the United States has sold submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and support systems to the United Kingdom. 
In 1980 and 1982, London chose to modernize its nuclear deterrent with Trident 
SLBMs. The British made a similar decision in 2006, and it may be reconfirmed 
in 2016 with legislation to construct a new fleet of Trident nuclear ballistic missile 
submarines. Britain has been motivated to remain a nuclear weapons state in 
order to protect its own national security interests and to contribute to the security 
of its NATO allies in an unpredictable international security environment.  
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 1 
I. BRITAIN’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE AND THE U.S.-
U.K. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the 1940s, when the United Kingdom began its nuclear weapons 
endeavor, it has been challenged to determine the role and utility of nuclear 
weapons in relation to its national strategic and political objectives, including the 
deterrence of aggression. British policy-making, including thinking about how to 
utilize nuclear weapons to achieve such goals, has evolved since the 
manufacture of Britain’s first nuclear weapon. This thesis investigates the 
question, “How can the evolution of British nuclear strategy be explained?” 
Britain is one of the oldest nuclear powers, and it has been obliged to shape its 
nuclear weapons strategy across a wide range of strategic environments, against 
a background of continuous technological change. This thesis examines how 
British nuclear strategy changed during the Cold War and subsequently. It 
highlights the most important motives for change, and illustrates the impact of the 
nuclear thinking on British conduct. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Nuclear weapons are capable of inflicting extraordinary destruction, 
depending on their design, yield, mode of delivery, and other variables. The 
question of how and under what conditions Britain might use nuclear weapons is, 
therefore, of great domestic and international importance. An historical analysis 
of how British nuclear thinking has evolved may shed light on what has 
influenced the United Kingdom’s nuclear strategy and how it might change in the 
future.  
It is also important to understand that new technologies—weapons or 




role they will play in society and politics. Applications and understandings of new 
technology arise from trial and error, and are always influenced by the 
surrounding policy environment.  
The British journey of nuclear discovery and nuclear thinking illustrates 
this. Like other nuclear powers, Britain has been required to continuously 
evaluate its strategic outlook in light of the potential obsolescence or 
deterioration of its current forces. In particular, the British have been required by 
their own budget and planning process to justify their nuclear strategy every 20 
years or so, as the lifespan of their nuclear submarine fleet nears an end and 
they must decide whether to build new submarines. This cycle has become one 
of Britain’s recurring points of decision, and this makes a general accounting of 
Britain’s nuclear experience particularly worthwhile. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis will examine the evolution of British nuclear thinking and 
strategy, and it is important to set the parameters of what this thesis will 
specifically consider. This thesis obviously cannot address every inflection of the 
British nuclear journey. The inflection points chosen for this thesis are viewed by 
the author as being the most significant and relevant to nuclear thinking and 
strategy. In addition, the author does not assume that the British have been 
influenced by a single factor in revising their nuclear policies; instead, strategic 
shifts are best understood as resulting from a combination of many factors. 
However, this thesis will focus on what appear to be the most influential 
considerations for each inflection point.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Britain was the first country to study atomic energy as a matter of national 
policy for the purpose of developing new weapons.1 Its nuclear weapons program 
                                            
1 Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and the 
Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
2000), 18.  
 3 
began in 1940. In 1941, when scientists confirmed that “the scheme for a 
uranium bomb is practicable”2 and that the bomb should be created, “Churchill 
and the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the quest for its creation.”3 Ian Clark, an expert 
on the Anglo-American special relationship, states in his book, Nuclear 
Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957–
1962, that the fear of German atomic capability and the loss of British stature 
initially drove Britain’s desire for the atomic bomb.4  
Margaret Gowing is a considered “the official historian of the British atomic 
energy programme.”5 In her book, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and 
Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, Volume 1, Policy Making, she describes how Britain 
arrived at the decision to acquire nuclear weapons.6 She writes that the Chiefs of 
Staff said in October 1945 that “British production of atomic weapons should start 
as soon as possible,” and that the ministers agreed that, “whatever arrangements 
might be made in the international field, Britain should undertake production of 
bombs on a large scale for her own defence as soon as possible.”7 One of the 
most identifiable people who opposed British acquisition of nuclear weapons, 
according to Gowing, was physics professor and Labour party member Patrick 
Maynard Stuart Blackett, who argued that British atomic bombs would reduce 
security rather than increase it.8 In Blackett’s view, atomic bombs “significantly 
increased the vulnerability of the United Kingdom” and made Britain “the ideal 
                                            
2 Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7. 
3 Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and 
America, 1957–1962 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 22. 
4 Ibid. 
5 John Baylis, “British Global Strategy Paper of 1952,” Journal of Strategic Studies 16, no. 2 
(1993): 201, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399308437514.  
6 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1972. 
Vol. 1, Policy Making (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974). 
7 Ibid., 164. 
8 Ibid,. 171. 
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target for atomic attack.”9 Margaret Gowing found only one document, written by 
Professor Blackett in February 1947, that recommended that the British 
government reconsider its decision to make atomic bombs. Gowing read his 
paper as a last plea to the government, although it is unclear whether he knew 
that the government had made its decision to establish an atomic weapons 
program in January 1947.10  
Gowing argues that Britain’s decision to develop atomic weapons was not 
necessarily based on a security threat at the time, but rather “a feeling that 
Britain must possess so climacteric a weapon in order to deter an atomically 
armed enemy, a feeling that Britain as a great power must acquire all major new 
weapons, a feeling that atomic weapons were a manifestation of that scientific 
and technological superiority on which Britain’s strength… must depend.”11 The 
British also wished to gain influence in Washington and felt that they would be 
more readily heard if they possessed atomic weapons.12 Ian Clark and Nicholas 
Wheeler also argue that the decision to make atomic bombs was not “merely a 
response to the rejection of continued collaboration by the United States in its 
1946 Atomic Energy Act,” also known as the McMahon Act.13 
The McMahon Act of 1946 served as a catalyst for Britain to develop an 
independent nuclear weapons program because the British realized that 
Washington would not facilitate further nuclear collaboration, and Britain did not 
want to be left behind the technological curve. In January 1947, the Attlee 
                                            
9 Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett quoted in Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning 
Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–
1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 22. 
10 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1972. 
Vol. 1, Policy Making (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 183. 
11 Ibid., 184. 
12 Ibid., 185. 
13 Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 44. 
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government initiated an independent nuclear weapons program.14 Initially, 
studies predicted that nuclear bombs would be utilized to attack “‘industry and 
population.’”15 Lawrence Freedman reports “that until 1948 there was no official 
permission to consider the Soviet Union as an ‘enemy.’”16 Ian Clark and Nicholas 
Wheeler note that the Soviet Union was consistently perceived as a potential 
threat post-World War II. The British Chiefs of Staff stated in 1946 that “recent 
developments make it appear that Russia is our most probable potential enemy, 
far more dangerous than a revived Germany.”17 It was not until October 3, 1952 
that Britain exhibited its nuclear weapons capability to the world via its first 
nuclear weapon explosive test.18 
In 1947, nuclear weapons possession was viewed as a sufficient deterrent 
against Soviet aggression.19 Lawrence Freedman noted that it was more 
important for Britain to possess nuclear ability than nuclear strategy; the Chiefs of 
Staff believed in 1947 that “the knowledge that we possessed weapons of mass 
destruction and were prepared to use them would be the most effective deterrent 
to war itself.”20 The British government’s strategy was “not a strategy for fighting 
a war against the Soviet Union, but rather one for preventing it.”21 John Baylis 
noted that the Global Strategy Paper of 1952 marked a change in British nuclear 
                                            
14 John Baylis, "The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for 
Nuclear Interdependence," Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3 (2008): 427–8, doi: 
10.1080/01402390802024726. 
15 Lawrence Freedman, "British Nuclear Targeting," Defense Analysis 1, no. 2 (1985): 82, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07430178508405190. 
16 Ibid. 
17 British Chiefs of Staff quoted in Ian Clark and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The British Origins of 
Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 58. 
18 A. J. R. Groom, “The British Deterrent,” in British Defence Policy in a Changing World, ed. 
John Baylis (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 126.  
19 Martin S. Navias, “Strengthening the Deterrent? The British Medium Bomber Force 
Debate, 1955–56,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 2 (1988): 204, http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1080/01402398808437338. 
20 Lawrence Freedman, "British Nuclear Targeting," Defense Analysis 1, no. 2 (1985): 82-83, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07430178508405190. 
21 John Baylis, “British Global Strategy Paper of 1952,” Journal of Strategic Studies 16, no. 2 
(1993): 206, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399308437514. 
 6 
thinking regarding the Soviets. In 1950, the Chiefs of Staff had judged that the 
risk of the Soviet Union attacking Western Europe or the United States was “a 
strong possibility…in the near future.”22 But in 1952, the Chiefs of Staff no longer 
held this view; they thought that the nuclear capabilities of the West had grown to 
the point that the Soviet Union would not dare to risk severe retaliation.23 In 1985 
John Roper wrote that “from the very beginning of British nuclear programmes, 
the vulnerability of delivery systems to Soviet attack or defence has determined 
the choice of launcher selected.”24 
Britain’s first nuclear weapon delivery platform specifically designed for 
that purpose was a fleet of aircraft called the V-bombers.25 S. J. Ball analyzes 
Britain’s V-bomber development and strategy in his book, The Bomber in British 
Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain’s World Role, 1945–1960.26 Ball writes 
that the Royal Air Force believed that the V-bombers could play a big role in the 
Cold War due to their multidimensional capabilities of conventional and nuclear 
missions, quick mobilization, range of up to 4,000 miles, and bomb payload of up 
to 30,000 lbs, with an estimated accuracy of 500 yards.27 The British hoped that 
the V-bombers would be a symbol and instrument of Britain’s independent 
nuclear deterrent as a contribution to the Western alliance deterrent and as an 




                                            
22 Ibid., 205. 
23 Ibid. 
24 John Roper, “The British Nuclear Deterrent and New Developments in Ballistic-Missile 
Defence,” The World Today 41, no. 5 (1985): 92, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395732. 
25 The Canberra light bomber aircraft were originally designed for conventional missions. 
Humphrey Wynn, The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces: their origins, roles, and 
deployment 1946–1969: A Documentary History (London: The Stationery Office, 1994), 123. 
26 S. J. Ball, The Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain's World Role, 
1945-1960 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).  
27 Ibid., 111. 
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cooperation and influence American policy.28 The 1958 Defence White Paper 
vowed, “when fully equipped with megaton weapons the British bomber force will 
in itself constitute a formidable deterrent.”29 
Martin S. Navias, in his article “Strengthening the Deterrent? The British 
Medium Bomber Force Debate, 1955-56,” describes the British V-bomber 
strategy during the development of the force. Lord Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of 
Defense in 1955, “told the Defense Committee that the first objective of the 
British medium bomber force was the destruction of Soviet air bases from which 
attacks on Britain could be launched.”30 Secondly, the V-bombers would be used 
to slow down any effort by the Soviet ground forces to carry out an offensive, and 
lastly, they would conduct strikes on Soviet nuclear assets and cities.31 Navias 
also remarks that the Royal Air Force (RAF) estimated that only half of the 
medium bombers would reach their targets, a judgment that calls into question 
the RAF’s relentless push for the V-bombers as a nuclear deterrent platform. The 
RAF wanted the V-bombers to promote its role and power. Stephen Twigge and 
Len Scott point out that intelligence deficiencies regarding “navigational aids and 
accurate maps of the USSR made precision bombing virtually impossible.”32 
Martin S. Navias argues that Britain did not necessarily have the goal of 
obtaining an independent deterrent prior to 1957.33 He writes that “the 
confidence manifested on the declaratory level about the growing importance of 
the nuclear deterrent was not matched by unanimity about the procurement and 
                                            
28 Ibid., 143–144. 
29 1958 Defence White Paper quoted in Lawrence Freedman, “British Nuclear Targeting,” 
Defense Analysis 1, no. 2 (1985): 85, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07430178508405190.  
30 Martin S. Navias, “Strengthening the Deterrent? The British Medium Bomber Force 
Debate, 1955–56,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 2 (1988): 207, http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1080/01402398808437338.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and the 
Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
2000), 23. 
33 Martin S. Navias, “Strengthening the Deterrent? The British Medium Bomber Force 
Debate, 1955-56,” Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 2 (1988): 203, http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1080/01402398808437338. 
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deployment of medium bombers.” In his view, the size of the V-bomber fleet was 
less than optimal due to budgetary constraints.34 
As the British came to realize the vulnerability of the V-bomber fleet to 
preemptive strikes and inflight attacks, they concluded that they needed a more 
credible nuclear deterrent delivery platform. London looked to ballistic missiles, 
both air and ground launched, as the next credible step. London asked 
Washington if Britain could participate in the collaborative development of 
nuclear ballistic missile capability. President Eisenhower told Congress that the 
McMahon Act was no longer relevant with the Soviet Union’s first thermonuclear 
explosive test in August 1953.35 John Baylis and Alan Macmillan wrote that the 
1952 Global Strategy Paper was an influential document in British nuclear 
strategy. Although the strategy did not change fundamentally, the British 
awareness of nuclear strategy matured. In the 1952 Global Strategy Paper, the 
Chiefs of Staff wrote, “in the event of war,” Russia would see Britain as “the first 
and principal target” for nuclear attack; therefore, Britain felt that it had “sound 
strategic grounds for a British nuclear force.”36 The paper also emphasized the 
importance of British alliances, especially the relationship with the United States, 
economic constraints on the British commitment to NATO, and the judgment of 
the Chiefs of Staff as to the “limits to the value of nuclear weapons and 
deterrence.”37  
The British decided to develop a “liquid-fueled IRBM of 2000 mile range 
and fired from an ‘unhardened’ silo,” which they called Blue Streak, to act as a 
strategic nuclear delivery system.38 Blue Streak would be—according to the 
                                            
34 Ibid., 204. 
35 John Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for 
Nuclear Interdependence," Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3 (2008): 430, doi: 
10.1080/01402390802024726. 
36 John Baylis and Alan Macmillan, “The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 16, no. 2 (1993): 209, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402399308437514. 
37 Ibid., 202, 203, 208. 
38 Kevin Harrison, “From Independence to Dependence: Blue Streak, Skybolt, Nassau, and 
Polaris,” RUSI Journal 127, no. 4 (1982): 26, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071848208523423. 
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government’s plans—the successor of the V-bombers.39 Washington was 
developing an air-launched ballistic missile with a range of 800 miles, which the 
Americans named Skybolt.40 The RAF preferred Skybolt missiles because it 
would maintain the nuclear deterrent responsibility. The Blue Streak missile 
project was officially cancelled on April 13, 1960 when the Minister of Defense, 
Harold Watkinson, made the announcement to the House of Commons.41 The 
missile was obsolete before it was developed. According to Kevin Harrison, 
The 1960 early warning agreement with the US to build Fylingdales 
would eventually give Britain four minutes warning of a Soviet 
missile attack. As Blue Streak took at least 20 minutes to fuel-up, it 
was always extremely vulnerable to a surprise first-strike. 
Protecting this dinosaur, by building hardened silos, was beyond 
the willingness and ability of the British government to fund.42 
The British hoped to utilize a U.S. missile—Skybolt—instead of their Blue 
Streak missiles to save time and money. In Harrison’s words, “they had placed all 
their nuclear hopes on its success.”43 The Royal Air Force wanted Skybolt as a 
strategic asset for targeting large cities, which would preserve more V-bombers 
(and extend their service life), and eliminate the requirement for ground-launched 
missile silos.44 Skybolt was attractive to the British government because it was 
believed to be a more credible delivery system than aircraft equipped with gravity 
bombs, and it was cheaper for the British to buy missiles from the Americans 
than to develop their own.45 
A. J. R. Groom states in his book British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons 
that there was a debate regarding the nuclear employment strategy that Britain 
should adopt: massive retaliation or “some form of graduated deterrence.” 
                                            
39 Ibid. 







Massive retaliation was defined as the use of nuclear weapons to indiscriminately 
damage an enemy, whereas graduated deterrence was seen as a more tactical 
use of nuclear weapons for focused strikes. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles first introduced massive retaliation as a doctrine in January 1954 when 
addressing the Council on Foreign Relations.46 According to Groom, the goal of 
graduated deterrence was to deter aggression through a capacity for restrained 
use of atomic and chemical weapons and to prevent an all-out nuclear war.47 Sir 
Anthony Buzzard, a former Chief of Naval Intelligence, supported the idea of 
graduated deterrence. Groom summarized Buzzard’s thinking as follows:  
Just as he argued that mutual deterrence was making massive 
retaliation less credible, and so less effective, as a deterrent, so 
would mutual deterrence render it difficult to threaten the credible 
and effective use of strategic hydrogen airpower ‘as a means of 
compelling an aggressor to accept our distinctions in the use of 
nuclear weapons.’48  
Since no state had a monopoly on nuclear weapons technology, Buzzard argued, 
graduated deterrence was the only credible method to utilize nuclear weapons.49 
The U.S. government cancelled the Skybolt program due to rising 
development costs and because it “did not really stand a chance against such 
competition [as the Hound Dog, Polaris, and Minuteman]. It was seen as being 
too slow to be a first-strike weapon, too vulnerable to an enemy first-strike and 
lacked both the penetration and accuracy of Minuteman and Polaris.”50 The 
United States offered to donate its Skybolt project to Britain and to give the 
British $30 million “as a gesture of good faith.”51 The British declined the offer. 
The British denied that they had refused Washington’s offer to sell them the 
                                            
46 Ibid., 60. 
47 Ibid., 76. 
48 Ibid., 77. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Kevin Harrison, “From Independence to Dependence: Blue Streak, Skybolt, Nassau, and 
Polaris,” RUSI Journal 127, no. 4 (1982): 29, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071848208523423. 
51 Ibid., 30. 
 11 
Hound Dog ALBM because of its name.52 President Kennedy offered the Polaris 
submarine-launched ballistic missile to Prime Minister Macmillan and he 
accepted it.53 The submarines and the nuclear warheads were to be British-
made, while the Polaris missiles and support systems were to be bought from the 
United States. “The Prime Minister made it clear that except where H.M.G. may 
decide that supreme national interests are at stake, these British forces will be 
used for the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in all 
circumstances.”54 
Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles were an attractive substitute 
for the more vulnerable Blue Streak and Skybolt missiles. According to A. J. R. 
Groom, the British preferred the Skybolt missile but thought that it would be too 
expensive in the short time it would be used, since the V-bomber force would 
need to be replaced soon after Britain acquired the Skybolt missile and the 
bombers were more vulnerable than Polaris submarines. In Groom’s words, 
initially the “Polaris missile did not have a range which met Britain’s requirements 
for a strategic weapon but its successor, the A2, carried a one megaton warhead 
1500 miles, and was quickly followed by the A3 with a range of 2500 miles.”55 
Britain finally had an independent delivery platform that was invulnerable to 
Soviet attack and equipped with missiles that could reach the Soviet Union. 
Lawrence Freedman argues that, although Polaris improved the British 
deterrent’s survivability, once the submarine employed a missile, its position was 
compromised. In his view, the V-bombers had a better chance of finding their 
                                            
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Prime Minister Macmillan—The Nassau 
Agreement, December 21, 1962,” statement on Nuclear Defense Systems, Par. 8, accessed 
March 12, 2014, http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1962/jfk554_62.html. 
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targets and they could be employed quickly, even though they had only a 50 
percent chance of reaching their targets.56  
Kevin Harrison points out that some critics of the Polaris missile at the 
time argued that 20 Polaris submarines would be needed to carry the 280 
megatons that the V-bomber force could carry, and that relying on four Polaris 
submarines would decrease Britain’s deterrent capability.57 The Polaris 
submarine fleet did, however, offer an invulnerable second-strike platform.58 
Freedman remarks that the British strategy for Polaris was to use it as a second-
strike, “counter-value retaliation” deterrence weapon due to its relative inflexibility 
and reduced warhead payload in comparison with the V-bombers.59 
Britain’s decision to replace Polaris with U.S. Trident missiles was 
influenced by its desire for “a sufficient increase in capacity to provide a hedge 
against Soviet BMD development” and to stay closely connected with the United 
States, according to John Roper.60 Staying connected to the United States 
meant not only technology compatibility but also decreased costs relative to 
Britain developing the technology itself. The Trident missile was also designed in 
response to the growing Soviet ballistic missile defense capabilities; each 
warhead requires separate targeting once released from the missile itself.61 One 
of the biggest upgrades regarding the Trident missile was the number of 
warheads that could be employed; the Trident C-4 missile could carry eight 
warheads and the Trident D-5 missile, which the British chose to procure, could 
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carry up to 14.62 This increased payload potential “created a requirement to 
begin a rethink of targeting policy.”63 According to the 1980 Memorandum on 
Polaris, the British government believed that “the concept of deterrence is 
concerned essentially with posing a potential threat to key aspects of Soviet state 
power.”64 
Kevin Harrison argued in 1982 that Trident solidified the trend of British 
dependence on American technology. The increasing age of the Polaris 
submarine fleet was an influential factor in finding a replacement for Polaris, and 
Trident was the preferred successor. However, because the American systems 
were built to achieve American strategic goals, Harrison argued that the systems 
provided Britain “an irrelevant, barely minimal nuclear deterrent and crumbling 
conventional forces” at a higher than expected cost.65  
Today, Britain maintains an independent nuclear deterrent of four Trident 
submarines stationed in Faslane, Scotland.66 Parliament has voted to build a 
new generation of nuclear weapons-equipped submarines to replace the current 
fleet. The Final Gate vote regarding final contract and budgetary plans is 
scheduled to take place in 2016.67 Although Parliament has voted to retain 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent capability, the votes to date have hardly been 
unanimous. Some members of the Labour Party hold that the nuclear deterrent 
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capability is unnecessary and too expensive. Some observers argue that Britain 
should keep nuclear weapons but abandon the continuous at-sea deterrence 
policy.68  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will analyze the historical development of the British nuclear 
deterrence program from its roots to 2012, with particular reference to the 
contemporary thinking that shaped British conduct at the time. The underlying 
factors that drove the evolution of nuclear strategy throughout Britain’s history 
include technology, perceived national security requirements, budgetary 
constraints, internal political agendas, national pride, and aspirations to global 
influence. Historical analysis will be the foundation of the thesis, and the sources 
utilized will include those discussed in the literature review.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows. This thesis proposal will serve as the 
introduction. Chapter II will discuss the origins of the British nuclear weapons 
program and will examine Britain’s V-Bombers and massive retaliation strategy. 
Chapter III will discuss Britain’s journey towards acquiring a more credible 
nuclear delivery system—submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Chapter IV will 
examine Britain’s Polaris fleet and the maturation of its deterrence policy and will 
address the U.S.-UK special relationship during Britain’s transition to Trident 
SLBMs and submarines. Chapter V, the final chapter, will address Britain’s post-
Cold War strategy regarding nuclear weapons.  
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II. BRITAIN AND THE ATOMIC BOMB: BECOMING A 
NUCLEAR POWER  
British scientists discovered atomic energy had potential use for weaponry 
in 1940. According to Karl Hufbauer, “British physicists… were initially as 
skeptical as most of their colleagues around the world about the immediate 
prospects for fission weapons. In April 1940, however, a secret committee of 
British physicists was established to consider the possibility… that a superbomb 
might be made from uranium-235.”69 Without identifying a particular adversary at 
the time, Britain realized that atomic bombs could be the weapons of the future 
and that the United Kingdom’s possession of them would demonstrate its 
prestige, status, and military power to the world. Nuclear weapons were seen as 
a symbol of standing and might, a symbol that Great Britain wanted to acquire. 
By 1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved the Ministry of 
Aircraft Uranium Development (MAUD) committee’s recommendation to design 
and build uranium bombs under the project name “Tube Alloys.”70 The British 
believed that, in order to maintain their global power status, they would need the 
best weapons and the most advanced technology; therefore, Britain began its 
quest to develop the first atomic bomb.  
The MAUD committee report was also sent to the United States to recruit 
its support and endorsement for nuclear weapons research, and it was a 
principal element in the United States’ choice to develop nuclear weapons. In the 
words of Karl Hufbauer, “the British report played, that is, a decisive role in the 
initiation of both the British and American bomb projects.”71 The MAUD report 
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argued that an atomic bomb could be developed before the end of the Second 
World War.72 President Roosevelt endorsed the construction of an atomic bomb 
in June 1942.73 Both the United States and Britain were motivated to develop an 
atomic bomb before the war ended due to the fear of Nazi Germany acquiring the 
weapon first and using it against the Allies.74 If the Germans knew that the Allies 
had developed atomic bombs, they might be less likely to use them for fear of 
retaliation.  
In 1943, the United States invited Britain to join a collaborative nuclear 
weapons effort called the Manhattan Project. Although it seems that there would 
be a risk of rivalry in sharing the development of the atomic bomb, Britain saw 
that it could benefit from US resources, technology, and alliance support if it 
worked with the United States and that cooperation would also cut costs and 
save time. On August 19, 1943, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to share nuclear weapons information, resources, 
and research under the Quebec Agreement.75 The British decided that 
collaborating with the United States would be more beneficial than if they were to 
develop the bomb unilaterally, and they were, therefore, eager to solidify the 
arrangement.76 
Britain combined efforts with the United States and Canada to develop the 
first atomic bomb.77 By 1943, however, Britain was already behind the United 
States in technical development and was only able to make “minor 
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contributions.”78 Ronald W. Clark argues that it was Churchill who was able to 
influence the United States not to inform Moscow about the nuclear weapons 
project. According to Ronald W. Clark. “Churchill’s influence was especially 
pronounced on the issue of disclosure to the Soviet Union. In August 1943 he 
persuaded Roosevelt of the desirability of nondisclosure to third parties.”79  
On July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb explosive test was conducted in 
the United States.80 The successful test of the Manhattan Project’s atomic bomb 
was a victory for all involved. According to Harrie Massey, “the impressive results 
achieved by the Manhattan Project were primarily responsible for the belief that, 
given sufficient resources, a large body of scientists could solve any soluble 
problem, no matter how difficult, in a relatively short time.”81 The camaraderie, 
however, was short-lived. Following the test, the US Congress decided that 
atomic bomb technology should be restricted to the United States.82 A year after 
the test, on August 1, 1946, President Harry S. Truman signed the McMahon Act 
of 1946, restricting the transfer of all atomic bomb information and resources to 
foreign governments, including US allies.83 
The McMahon Act brought Britain’s access to the U.S. atomic 
technology—which the British had helped to develop—to a halt. This act 
undermined the agreements between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, the Quebec Agreement and Hyde Park Agreement, 
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which promised continued nuclear information sharing post-World War II. The US 
government denied knowing about the agreement. As Richard Gott put it,  
Mr. Roosevelt died, and the note signed at Hyde Park in 1944 was 
lost among his papers. The Quebec agreement had been an 
executive agreement, binding only on the administration that 
negotiated it. Worried senators, jealous of America’s lead in atomic 
energy and anxious to keep it, had never seen the agreement.84  
Prime Minister Clement Attlee justified the development of a British bomb 
following what the British saw as a betrayal by the United States when he stated, 
“We had to bear in mind that there was always the probability of (the Americans) 
withdrawing and becoming isolationists once again. The manufacture of a British 
atom bomb was therefore at that stage essential to our defence.”85 
Britain preserved its conviction that it wanted to possess nuclear weapons 
to establish its global status. The British also judged that if they became a 
nuclear power on their own, the United States would be more likely to collaborate 
with them again. Britain was not willing to be left behind the technological curve 
or dropped from global-power club. Therefore, in January 1947, Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee reestablished Britain’s national nuclear weapons program.86 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin affirmed that Britain needed autonomous atomic 
weapons: “We've got to have this thing over here whatever it costs... We've got 
to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it.”87 Britain quickly established a team 
of scientists to make Britain a nuclear power. 
The High Explosives Research (HER) team was established with the 
mission of producing Britain’s first nuclear weapon. The name, HER, was used to 
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disguise the project’s mission.88 Fort Halstead, England, was chosen as the 
headquarters for nuclear weapon research and experimentation, but the project’s 
purpose remained a secret to many government officials. “The link between this 
project and the fort was a closely guarded secret, to the extent that even within 
government all orders were routed through the largely civil Atomic Energy 
Research Establishment (AERE)… until 1949.”89 Chief Superintendent 
Armaments Research (CSAR) William Penney was put in charge of the project. 
Penney had been a key figure in Britain’s contribution to the Manhattan Project in 
the United States.90 The project also included RAF scientists and other 
international scientists, including the émigré German scientist Klaus Fuchs who 
visited Fort Halstead to pass on information he had learned in the United States 
under the auspices of Manhattan Project.91 According to Wayne Cocroft, “The 
urgency and importance of the work at Fort Halstead is reflected in the 
preparation of a design drawing for the Bomb Chamber. . . in July 1947, only two 
months after the formation of the High Explosives Research (HER) team.”92 
According to Humphrey Wynn, “the RAF team was starting from scratch, but had 
the benefit of [Dr. William] Penney’s knowledge and experience in the oversight 
of their work.”93  
The Soviet Union’s successful atomic bomb explosive test in August 1949 
took the world by surprise. The Soviet Union had been building nuclear weapon 
production capability as Britain and the United States worked on the Manhattan 
Project.94 Soviet spies were able to infiltrate British and American nuclear 
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facilities, including those associated with the Manhattan Project, and deliver 
information back to the Soviet Union.95 Beginning in 1941, the Soviet Union 
began to collect information and updates regarding atomic progress. In David 
Holloway’s words, “The Soviet government now knew that Britain had decided to 
build an atomic bomb, that British scientists estimated that it would take between 
two and five years to do this,” and that gaseous diffusion and uranium-235 would 
be used.96 According to David Holloway, “before the end of 1942 Stalin took the 
decision to restart nuclear research. This research finally got under way early in 
1943.”97 Klaus Fuchs was known to be one of the conduits of information from 
the Manhattan Project to the Soviet Union.98 Igor Kurchatov, a Soviet physicist, 
became very familiar with progress of the Manhattan Project. “In July 1943 
Kurchatov wrote another memorandum… about intelligence on the Manhattan 
project. It is evident from this memorandum that the Soviet Union had received 
extensive information about the progress of the United States effort.”99 The 
Soviet Union even requested nuclear materials from the United States, and the 
United States delivered them.  
At the end of January 1943 the Soviet government sent a request 
to the Lend-Lease Administration in Washington, DC for 10 
kilograms of uranium metal, and 100 kilograms each of uranium 
oxide and uranium nitrate. General Groves approved this request, 
for fear that refusal would alert the Soviet Union to the American 
project or excite curiosity in Washington.100 
As soon as the United States halted all international nuclear collaboration in 
1946, Britain fell behind the Soviet Union in atomic bomb development. 
Britain felt under pressure to catch up with the United States and the 
Soviet Union in atomic capability. At the same time, the Soviet Union became a 
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greater threat to Britain’s security with its acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the 
late 1940s, Britain identified the Soviet Union as a real and potentially imminent 
threat to its security. As noted in the introduction, Lawrence Freedman has 
argued “that until 1948 there was no official permission to consider the Soviet 
Union an ‘enemy.’”101 Not only were nuclear weapons important to the United 
Kingdom’s status and future alliance strategy; they were also imperative to 
ensure Britain’s security against the Soviet Union.  
The speed of Soviet long-range missile development was a source of 
concern for Britain’s trust in the U.S. promise of extended deterrence. If the 
Soviet Union’s long-range missiles could reach North America, some Britons 
reasoned, the United States would be less likely to engage in war with the Soviet 
Union on Britain’s behalf for fear of endangering its own security.102 Margaret 
Gowing argues that that the British need for atomic weapons did not stem from a 
sense of fear of the Soviet Union, but instead arose from “a feeling that atomic 
weapons were a manifestation of the scientific and technological superiority on 
which Britain’s strength… must depend.”103 Despite the fact that the United 
Kingdom had worked with the United States in the development of nuclear 
weapons, the manufacture of Britain’s first atomic bomb took longer and was 
much higher in cost than anticipated.  
Britain achieved nuclear weapons status on October 3, 1952 with its first 
successful explosive test on Monte Bello Islands, Australia:104 three years after 
the Soviet Union and seven years after the United States.105 One may ask why it 
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took Britain so long to develop nuclear weapons after starting its atomic weapons 
program in 1940 and working closely with the United States for three years until 
the McMahon Act of 1946.  
The answer is multidimensional: economics, resource access, and 
scientific knowledge. The exertions of World War II meant that the British 
economy had taken a severe hit. The funding required for expensive nuclear 
materials, testing facilities, and personnel was not readily available in the 
defense budget. After the McMahon Act entered into force, nuclear materials 
were hard to obtain. In addition, enriching uranium and producing plutonium were 
time consuming and costly tasks. According to Humphrey Wynn, “while the 
international situation gave increased urgency to the military atomic energy 
programme, its real pace-maker was the supply of plutonium.”106  
Finally, scientific knowledge of the production of nuclear weapons was not 
widespread following the Manhattan Project. Very few British scientists had the 
ability to make weapons. In Humphrey Wynn’s words, “the only man in Britain in 
1946-47 with first-hand experience of designing, building and testing atomic 
bombs was Dr. [William] Penney.”107 As mentioned previously, German émigré 
scientist Klaus Fuchs was known to have assisted the British in developing 
nuclear weapons as well as the Soviet Union—and he was later exposed as a 
Soviet spy.108 The 1952 nuclear explosive test marked the culmination of years 
of work in obtaining the resources and applying the knowledge needed to 
produce Britain’s own nuclear weapon from scratch. 
Following October 1952, Britain possessed the technology but had not 
developed a strategy for the use of nuclear weapons. Due to their unmatched 
destructive capability, nuclear weapons were viewed as tools to obliterate the 
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enemy on the battlefield and to hold enemy cities at risk. Britain’s first nuclear 
weapons were large and heavy, and could not be quickly employed by any 
delivery system but aircraft at the time. The British looked to aircraft as their 
nuclear weapons delivery vehicle for this reason; aircraft could travel relatively 
long distances quickly while carrying heavy cargo.  
Britain developed atomic strike capability using aircraft as the delivery 
platform a few years following its first successful nuclear test. The British named 
these atomic-weapons capable aircraft Canberras and V-bombers. The Royal Air 
Force (RAF) fought tirelessly to govern the nuclear delivery vehicles. RAF 
leaders did not want the responsibility to be given to any other military service.109 
The V-bombers, according to the Air Staff at the time, were to be used to 
threaten Russian cities. 
Attacks must therefore be directed against objectives whose 
destruction will lower enemy morale, reduce their industrial 
capacity, and dislocate a large part of the centralized administrative 
machinery of the country. The only objectives that fulfill these 
requirements are large cities, and it is our considered opinion that 
our only chance of securing a quick decision is by launching a 
devastating attack upon them with absolute weapons.110 
Threatening to attack Soviet cities was viewed as the most effective strategy for 
victory and deterrence.111 The Soviet Union was less vulnerable to nuclear attack 
than Britain because its population and infrastructure were so spread out; 
therefore, Britain had to make up for its disadvantage in the size of its bomber 
fleet, according to the RAF.112  
There were disagreements among government officials as to what size the 
bomber fleet should be. The military, including the RAF, argued that the fleet 
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should be no less than 240 bombers. British Minister of Defence “Selwyn Lloyd 
was adamant that it would not be possible to reduce the proposed force below 
240 units.”113 According to Lloyd, the bombers would first strike air bases to 
prevent the Soviets from launching strikes on Britain. The bombers would then 
be ordered to stunt the Soviet ground forces, and finally they would attack 
remaining Soviet nuclear resources and infrastructure.114 Lloyd predicted that the 
Soviets could possess 850 bombers of their own, launched from 40 air bases 
with the capability of launching from an additional 150 alternate locations.115 In 
addition, Martin Navias has reported, “the RAF believed that only 50 percent of 
its front-line medium bombers would reach their targets.”116  
Defence budget cuts reduced bomber procurement from 240 to 200, and 
they were reduced again to a fleet of only 180. Chief of the Air Staff William 
Dickson argued against the fleet reduction, and said, “our proposed contribution 
[of 240 bombers] was certainly the minimum necessary.”117 In addition, the RAF 
believed in 1952 that the bomber force would serve as an effective deterrent and 
would significantly decrease the need for conventional forces.118 The RAF 
proposed, therefore, alleviating the budgetary requirements for a robust 
conventional force and allocating additional funding to the nuclear-equipped 
bomber force.  
With the establishment of Britain’s independent atomic weapons and 
delivery platforms, the British government hoped to gain support from the United 
States for future collaborative projects. The United States agreed to open the 
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door to nuclear sharing with Britain once it had been established that both Britain 
and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons and the United States no 
longer held the nuclear monopoly. According to Harrison,  
The Washington Declaration and Eisenhower’s State of the Union 
Message of January 1958, attacking ‘artificial barriers to sharing’ 
knowledge between ‘friendly allies,’ led to changes in the McMahon 
Act greatly expanding the authorized areas for nuclear information 
exchange to include military purposes.119  
The United States also judged that working on nuclear weapons with the British 
would allow it to influence British policy.120  
Britain and the United States began collaboration on ballistic missiles. The 
British decided to develop a “liquid-fueled IRBM of 2000 mile range and fired 
from an ‘unhardened’ silo,” which they called Blue Streak, to act as a strategic 
nuclear delivery system.121 The British planned to make Blue Streak the 
successor of the V-bombers.122 Washington was developing an air-launched 
ballistic missile named Skybolt with a range of 800 miles.123 The British viewed 
both Skybolt and Blue Streak as potential replacement delivery systems for 
nuclear weapons—delivery systems that would increase their deterrence 
credibility. The V-Bombers were vulnerable to preemptive and inflight targeting, 
they risked human operators’ lives, and they probably would not always reach 
their targets. The British hoped that the Blue Streak and Skybolt programs would 
prove to be superior to the V-Bombers in their technical performance 
characteristics. 
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III. PLATFORM WORTHY OF THE ULTIMATE WEAPON: 
BRITAIN’S JOURNEY TOWARD A CREDIBLE DETERRENT 
In 1954, the Cold War was underway and Britain saw the Soviet Union as 
a severe nuclear threat. Britain recognized, however, that its V-bomber force was 
not a credible deterrent for Soviet aggression. The V-bombers were vulnerable to 
preemptive strikes while parked at airbases, as well as in-flight interception. Due 
to these vulnerabilities, the chances that the nuclear-armed aircraft would reach 
their targets and prove an effective delivery platform were low. According to 
Lawrence Freedman, “the RAF [Royal Air Force] believed that only 50 percent of 
its front-line medium bombers would reach their targets.”124 The Soviets 
recognized the vulnerabilities of the aircraft, and it further degraded the V-
bombers’ deterrence credibility.  
Britain sought a better, more effective nuclear delivery system to replace 
the V-Bombers. Britain proposed a collaborative project with the United States in 
1954 to develop ballistic missiles. In 1949, after the Soviet Union conducted its 
first successful nuclear explosive test, “there were hopes in Britain that the Soviet 
test would lead the Americans to abandon the McMahon Act.”125 The United 
States was more willing to share nuclear weapons information and resources 
with Britain now that Washington did not have a monopoly on the nuclear 
weapons market. Washington and London faced a common enemy, and Britain 
had with its 1952 nuclear weapons test established itself as a nuclear power.126 
President Eisenhower criticized the McMahon Act following the Soviet 
thermonuclear explosive test in 1953. In his judgment, “it was a ‘terrible piece of 
legislation’ and ‘one of the most deplorable incidents in American history of which 
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he personally felt ashamed.’”127 Britain agreed to work with the United States 
again since “the Government was looking to assistance from the United States to 
alleviate the budgetary and skilled-manpower pressure which maintenance of the 
strategic deterrent was coming to place on defence policy.”128 Britain was to 
create a medium-range ballistic missile and the United States was to develop an 
intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of over 5,000 nautical miles. 
Ballistic missiles were an attractive nuclear delivery means because they 
could engage targets at long ranges, were harder to intercept during flight than 
aircraft, and did not deteriorate and require as much rebuilding as aircraft. The 
change in platform forced a change in strategy for the British government. 
Lawrence Freedman remarks that the British strategy for Polaris was to use it as 
a second-strike, “counter-value retaliation” deterrence weapon due to its relative 
inflexibility and reduced warhead payload in comparison with the V-bombers.129  
Initially, Great Britain viewed nuclear weapons as total annihilation 
weapons and the strategy for their use was massive retaliation. In the words of 
Kevin Harrison, “both the United States and Britain placed a heavy reliance on 
nuclear weapons and the advocation of massive retaliation to deter Soviet 
aggression.”130 During Britain’s journey from gravity bombs to ballistic missiles, 
London changed its strategy from massive retaliation to graduated deterrence. 
Britain realized that the threat of massive retaliation was only credible in the 
absence of mutually assured destruction. According to Kevin Harrison,  
The 1962 Defence White Paper moved away from the doctrine of 
massive retaliation, but nevertheless still assumed a swift  
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escalation to nuclear war and placed their emphasis on war 
deterring rather than building up large conventional forces with 
which to fight a conventional war.131  
As technology improved for the deployment and targeting of nuclear forces, 
Great Britain realized that nuclear weapons could be used for more tactical, 
tailored defense, which A.J.R. Groom calls “graduated deterrence.”132  
Project Blue Streak was the United Kingdom’s medium-range ballistic 
missile program created in response to the V-Bombers’ vulnerabilities.133 It was 
to be the “potential successor to the V-bomber force in the mid-1960s” and was 
designed to be “a liquid-fueled IRBM of 2000 mile range and fired from an 
‘unhardened’ silo.”134 The missile was designed with the intent to decrease the 
risk of preemptive and inflight attacks by being launched from land, instead of 
from an aircraft, and with increased speed.  
The missile was also designed with enough range to reach the Soviet 
Union, in the hope that it would deter Soviet aggression or be able to retaliate in 
the event of a nuclear war. During development, however, the Blue Streak 
missile still proved to be vulnerable. The project proved to be more costly than 
originally anticipated, was not going as fast as the United States’ ballistic missile 
project, and was also seen as too vulnerable to preemptive attack.135 The Blue 
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Minister of Defense, Harold Watkinson, made the announcement to the House of 
Commons.136 The missile was obsolete before it was developed. According to 
Kevin Harrison, 
The 1960 early warning agreement with the US to build Fylingdales 
would eventually give Britain four minutes warning of a Soviet 
missile attack. As Blue Streak took at least 20 minutes to fuel-up, it 
was always extremely vulnerable to a surprise first-strike. 
Protecting this dinosaur, by building hardened silos, was beyond 
the willingness and ability of the British government to fund.137 
The British placed their hopes in the Skybolt missile to become their next 
nuclear delivery system. The Skybolt missile, developed by the United States, 
was an air-launched ballistic missile to be utilized by the British V-Bomber fleet. 
Kevin Harrison has described British planning at that time as follows: “The new 
missile would greatly extend the life of the all-British V-bomber force, probably 
into the late 1960s and early 1970s.”138 Adapting the V-bombers to carry the 
Skybolt missile was estimated to be less expensive than the Polaris fleet and 
some argued that it would create more domestic employment than building and 
operating the Polaris fleet. In addition, the V-bombers could also conduct 
conventional operations, making them more versatile.  
The RAF’s leaders wanted the British government to procure Skybolt 
missiles because they sought “to retain the British nuclear deterrent in their 
hands for prestige purposes.”139 The RAF argued that the Skybolt missile would 
decrease the number of V-bombers lost due to the missile’s increased range, 
relative to the probable losses from gravity bomb operations. Skybolt would also 
eliminate the need for land-based missile silos, keeping costs down.140 
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Although the British saw the Skybolt missile as the next preferred nuclear 
delivery platform, the United States’ enthusiasm for the program had steadily 
decreased with its development of the Minuteman, Hound Dog, and Polaris 
missiles. The Minuteman’s precision land-based targeting eliminated the need for 
bombers. “Hound Dog was far more accurate than Skybolt… cheaper; more 
difficult to track; had an estimated life expectancy with the B25H bomber of up to 
1975; and actually worked!”141 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles were 
not vulnerable to preemptive strikes, could carry a greater payload than Skybolt 
missiles, and could travel further. “Skybolt did not really stand a chance against 
such competition.”142 The Skybolt project was expensive and took more time to 
develop than alternative U.S. missile projects. The United States cancelled the 
Skybolt project and placed more emphasis on the development of alternative 
ballistic missiles, including Polaris. 
In July 1958, the governments of Great Britain and the United States 
agreed to formalize a nuclear partnership and collaboration in signing the U.S.-
UK Mutual Defense Agreement.143 This agreement covered the sharing of 
nuclear information, training opportunities, plans, etc. and was more 
comprehensive in scope than less formal agreements between the United States 
and other NATO countries. This agreement formalized the nuclear dimension of 
the US-UK special nuclear relationship, and it was made with a view to rebuilding 
relations between the two countries, which had been damaged by the McMahon 
Act.144  
Although the U.S-manufactured Thor missiles were the first collaborative 
nuclear missiles deployed in the United Kingdom, Britain did not own the 
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missiles. They were owned by the United States. According to John Baylis, “The 
warheads would remain under American control, as U.S. law required, but a joint 
Anglo-American decision would be required before the missiles were 
launched.”145 There was “an agreed understanding that, in a crisis, the RAF’s 
nuclear-capable aircraft would come under American command, in exchange for 
a pledge by the US government to consult the British government on potential 
nuclear use, time and circumstances permitting.”146 The United States wanted 
Thor to be available for the extended deterrence protection of NATO but the 
United Kingdom opposed the proposal because it did not want to be pulled into a 
nuclear war without a choice. According to Martin A. Smith,  
Concern about being drawn into a nuclear exchange with the USSR 
virtually automatically if any NATO member were attacked, even if 
the invaders used only conventional force, was combined with 
concerns about losing sovereign national control over decisions 
about not just whether, but also how, to commit the UK to war.147  
Therefore, Britain strongly affirmed its desire to procure an independent nuclear 
deterrent, over which it would maintain complete control and authority. 
President Kennedy met with Prime Minister Macmillan in Nassau, the 
Bahamas, in 1962 to negotiate terms for a replacement delivery system following 
the U.S. cancellation of the Skybolt project. The United States offered to donate 
its Skybolt project to Britain “recalling that the purpose of the offer of Skybolt to 
the United Kingdom in 1960 had been to assist in improving and extending the 
effective life of the British V-bombers,”148 and to give the British $30 million “as a 
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gesture of good faith.”149 The British declined the offer, knowing that they could 
not afford the costs associated with finishing Skybolt.150 The United States then 
offered Britain its Hound Dog missile, but Britain again declined. The British 
denied that they had refused Washington’s offer to sell them the Hound Dog 
ALBM because of its name.151  
President Kennedy agreed to sell Britain the United States’ Polaris 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles under the Nassau Agreement of 1962. The 
British government initially believed that “Skybolt would be considerably cheaper 
than Polaris, would allow the Government to recoup its investment in the V-
Bomber force, and offered an attractive degree of operational flexibility.”152 
Although submarines were not Great Britain’s first choice in nuclear delivery 
platforms, this agreement finally solidified its path to a credible independent 
deterrent.153 According to A. J. R. Groom,  
The original Polaris missile did not have a range which met Britain’s 
requirements for a strategic weapon but its successor, the A2, 
which entered service in the early sixties, carried a one megaton 
warhead 1500 miles, and it was quickly followed by the A3 with a 
range of 2500 miles.154 
Kevin Harrison points out that some critics of the Polaris missile at the 
time argued that 20 Polaris submarines would be needed to carry the 280 
megatons that the V-bomber force could carry, and that relying on four Polaris 
submarines would decrease Britain’s deterrent capability.155 The Polaris 
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submarine fleet did, however, offer an invulnerable second-strike platform.156 
There was also hesitation about procuring Polaris because it increased Britain’s 
reliance on the United States and further complicated Britain’s standing as an 
independent nuclear power. According to Ian Clark, “because purchase of an 
American missile would erode the independence of the British deterrent, it was 
recommended that thought be given to developing a Polaris-type solid-fuelled 
missile indigenously.”157 The idea of a British-made SLBM was quickly 
abandoned due to high estimated costs.  
Polaris submarines were built in the United Kingdom as well as the 
nuclear warheads carried onboard. The British government thought that it was 
important to maintain some autonomy in the development of its nuclear delivery 
platforms not only to boost its domestic industry but also to demonstrate its 
independence from the United States. Exhibiting independence from the United 
States was felt to strengthen the British nuclear deterrent because the United 
Kingdom could act unilaterally for its national security purposes. Therefore, the 
United States only provided the Polaris missiles and support systems. Britain 
finally had an independent delivery platform that was invulnerable to Soviet 
attack and equipped with missiles that could reach the Soviet Union. Britain had 
gained considerable ground in its journey towards a credible nuclear deterrent. In 
the words of Kevin Harrison, “The Nassau Agreements guaranteed the future of 
the British nuclear deterrent.”158  
Britain chose to build a fleet of four Polaris submarines. Possessing four 
nuclear-armed submarines ensured the redundancy that Britain wanted in order 
to increase force survivability in the event of a nuclear attack. One submarine 
was deployed at all times so that Britain would have at least one nuclear delivery 
platform that was virtually invulnerable to preemptive attack and that would act in 
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retaliation. The other three submarines rotated into the deployment position after 
a sequence of heavy and light maintenance periods and training cycles. 
Maintenance and training prepared the submarines and their crews for 
deployment and helped to extend the service life of the submarines.  
Britain recognized the Allied desire for its resources to be committed in 
support to NATO, including both conventional and nuclear forces.159 President 
Kennedy also emphasized the need to commit Polaris to NATO because “he still 
faced the problem of how to reconcile this [selling Polaris to Britain] with a desire 
to halt proliferation in NATO by means of a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLNF) 
and improving America’s relations with the French.”160 Prime Minister Macmillan 
agreed to commit Britain’s nuclear capability to the defense of NATO under the 
MLNF, along with Britain’s nuclear ally—the United States. Under the Nassau 
Agreement of 1962,  
the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose of 
their two governments with respect to the provision of the Polaris 
missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear 
force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies.161  
Britain, however, would retain the ability to withdraw its nuclear weapons 
from NATO missions if they were needed for national security. In the words of the 
“Nassau Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems,” “The Prime Minister made it 
clear that except where H.M.G. may decide that supreme national interests are at 
stake, these British forces will be used for the purposes of international defense 
of the Western Alliance in all circumstances.”162 Britain viewed this as a crucial 
provision so that its nuclear forces would be available to serve Britain’s interests 
and security above any other commitments. According to Martin A. Smith, 
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The Macmillan government had deliberately chosen to offer to 
earmark a future Polaris force for potential NATO missions, rather 
than assign it to NATO. In established NATO parlance there was an 
important difference between these concepts. Earmarked forces 
were declared as being prospectively available to allied command 
in times of crisis or conflict, but their release would have to be 
formally requested, and it could in principle be refused by the 
national government concerned.163 
Britain’s decision to earmark vice assign its nuclear forces for NATO 
extended deterrence allowed it to maintain its primary policy of maintaining an 
independent nuclear deterrent for its own national security. This policy stemmed 
from its fear of being dragged into a nuclear war without choice, owing to the 
U.S. desire to commit Thor missiles to NATO. With this policy, the ultimate 
authority for use of British nuclear weapons would remain with the British 
government.164 
The extended deterrence commitment of both Britain and the United 
States to NATO further discouraged potential aggressors from nuclear war with 
any of the NATO members. The British and the Americans agreed that the 
United Kingdom’s independent forces in conjunction with those of the United 
States created multiple centers of decision-making and complicated the risk 
assessment problem for adversaries and might therefore further deter a potential 
aggressor from action, than if Britain were to act alone. In addition, Britain’s 
“clear preference was for exclusive, bilateral ‘top table’ arrangements with the 
United States, with the rest of the NATO membership effectively relegated to 
second-tier involvement, if indeed their views were to be given serious 
consideration at all.”165 The U.S.-U.K. top-tier arrangement gave Britain the 
power and influence it had wanted in becoming a nuclear power. It also 
strengthened the nuclear special relationship and collaboration, which Britain 
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highly valued. Britain saw little need for non-nuclear-weapon-state NATO 
countries to participate in the decision-making process for nuclear policy and 
wanted to restrict it to the United States and Britain.166 
There was also a concern throughout Europe, including Britain, that the 
United States might not fulfill its extended deterrence commitment if Europe was 
attacked by the Soviet Union. This was one of the motivating factors for Britain to 
establish an independent nuclear deterrent, and it also was a concern for other 
NATO members. The idea that “the United States would not risk nuclear 
retaliation against its own cities by using nuclear weapons in response to Soviet 
aggression in Europe”167 influenced Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to write to 
President Kennedy in February 1962 as follows: 
One can argue quite plausibly that the existence of the British 
nuclear force gives some comfort both to those Europeans who 
fear that the United States might, in the last resort, shrink from 
using the nuclear deterrent for the defence of Europe and to those 
who, contrariwise, are worried lest America might use it too 
precipitately.168 
Alastair Buchan in 1960 argued, “If the US guarantee really was believed 
to be credible, there would logically be little need for a second, European-based, 
strategic nuclear capability within NATO.”169 Therefore, Britain’s commitment to 
NATO was two-fold: it sought to build relations with the United States and to 
reassure European allies. 
Britain’s journey toward gaining a credible nuclear deterrent posture did 
not transpire the way it had initially planned. Yet, Britain’s willingness to remain 
flexible and its aspiration to reestablish a collaborative relationship with the 
United States led ultimately to Britain’s acquisition of a credible nuclear delivery 
platform. The growing sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems 
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led to a shift in nuclear strategy, from threats to conduct massive retaliation 
attacks to graduated targeting and deterrence. Britain was able to sustain its 
policy of independence while working with the United States and committing to 
the protection of NATO. Although Britain succeeded in acquiring a more credible 
nuclear delivery platform to follow the V-Bombers, Britain continues its journey to 
develop policies and delivery platforms worthy of the ultimate weapon.  
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IV. MATURATION OF DETERRENCE POLICY: BRITAIN’S 
TRANSITION FROM POLARIS TO TRIDENT 
In 1980, the British Ministry of Defense announced the following judgment 
about nuclear weapons: “They cannot be disinvented; the only realistic course 
now available is to harness their existence to the service of peace in freedom, as 
NATO has done successfully for over thirty years.”170 The United Kingdom 
sought to acquire more advanced nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterring 
Soviet coercion or aggression. Following the Nassau Agreement of 1962 and the 
signing of the Polaris Sales Agreement on April 6, 1963, the United Kingdom 
began the process to design and construct a new generation of submarines that 
would carry U.S-built Polaris missiles and support systems.171 On January 3, 
1963, Prime Minister Macmillan said “that unlike Skybolt, ‘Polaris would extend 
the effectiveness and credibility of the United Kingdom deterrent for an almost 
indefinite period.’”172 The Labor Party argued in its General Election Manifesto in 
1964 that Polaris “will not be independent and it will not be British and it will not 
deter.”173 Despite Labour Party member criticisms, the first Polaris submarine, 
named the HMS Resolution, was commissioned in 1967.174  
Since British nuclear strategy had been developed around bombers, the 
United Kingdom was forced to construct a new nuclear strategy based on its 
newly acquired technology. Polaris submarines offered forward-deployed 
capability, invulnerability to preemptive attack, greater range, and less risk for 
military personnel during employment, compared to the V-bombers.  
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Britain resolved that in order to maintain nuclear deterrence, at least one 
Polaris submarine would have to be deployed and available at all times. The 
British called this element of their deterrence strategy Continuous At Sea 
Deterrence: “Since 1969 there has never been a moment when our Polaris force 
did not have at least one submarine on patrol.”175 The maintenance and training 
cycles of the other three submarines and their crews were staggered in order for 
a relief submarine to be available at all times if the deployed submarine 
encountered trouble. The British government justified such a high level of 
readiness for its nuclear submarines by saying that the United Kingdom did not 
have a nuclear triad like the United States and that an effective attack on the 
nuclear submarine force could wipe out the United Kingdom’s nuclear capabilities 
altogether. 176  In addition, if such an attack were successful, the repercussions 
of a war with the Soviet Union would be grim. 
According to Lawrence Freedman,  
The sea-based deterrent was considered to be a model second-
strike force—invulnerable to a first strike, while so incapable of 
attacking anything other than cities that it could not threaten a first 
strike itself. In terms of stability this was exemplary. When it came 
to surprise attacks, submarines neither threatened first strikes nor 
were they threatened by one.177 
British strategists believed that at least one submarine needed to be 
invulnerable to preemptive attack to maintain a credible deterrent and that 
deployed submarines were invulnerable; therefore, one submarine needed to be 
deployed at all times. The Polaris submarines’ technological merits and 
limitations supported the main objective of British nuclear strategy—to maintain 
credible nuclear deterrence protection for Britain through the threat of nuclear 
retaliation. Credible nuclear deterrence could only be achieved by maintaining an 
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independent nuclear deterrent capability. The British government maintained its 
position that extended deterrence by the United States might not ensure NATO’s 
security because the Soviet assessment might hold that the use of U.S. nuclear 
weapons for the protection of NATO (or Britain in particular) would be too 
dangerous for the United States to accept. In the words of an official U.K. policy 
document in 1980,  
The Government has great confidence in the depth of resolve 
underlying the United States commitment. But deterrence is a 
matter of perception, and perception by a potential adversary. The 
central consideration is what that adversary might believe, not what 
we or our Allies believe; our deterrence has to influence possible 
calculations made by leaders whose attitudes and values may differ 
sharply from those of the West. The decision to use United States 
nuclear weapons in defence of Europe, with all the risk to the 
United States homeland this would entail, would be enormously 
grave. A Soviet leadership—perhaps much changed in character 
from today’s, perhaps also operating amid the pressures of 
turbulent internal or external circumstances—might believe that it 
could impose its will on Europe by military force without becoming 
involved in strategic nuclear war with the United States. 
Modernised US nuclear forces in Europe help guard against any 
such misconception; but an independent capability fully under 
European control provides a key element of insurance.178 
In addition, Prime Minister Macmillan agreed to commit British nuclear 
deterrent resources to the extended deterrence protection of NATO members. 
This was believed to be an important aspect of British nuclear strategy because it 
solidified the United Kingdom’s nuclear commitment to its NATO Allies, 
strengthened its relationship with the United States in NATO, and provided 
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Polaris submarines were committed to the defense of NATO, Britain retained the 
right to utilize its nuclear forces “where H.M.G. may decide that supreme national 
interests are at stake.”179  
The expected service life of the Polaris submarines was to expire in the 
1990s.180 This forced Britain to build new submarines, adopt an alternative 
delivery platform, or consider nuclear disarmament. In 1995 Richard Ware wrote 
that, “Apart from the warheads, which were changed to the Chevaline type during 
the 1970s, the whole system dates from the 1960s and is now approaching 
obsolescence.”181 In 1979, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered a 
committee, MISC 7, to examine possible replacement options for Polaris.182 In 
1980, the Ministry of Defense published The Future United Kingdom Strategic 
Nuclear Deterrent Force, which announced the government’s decision to replace 
its Polaris submarine fleet with a new fleet of nuclear ballistic missile 
submarines.183  
In 1980, the British government endorsed the building of a new generation 
of nuclear-weapons-equipped submarines, the Vanguard class. This new class of 
submarines was designed to carry the next generation of U.S. submarine-
launched ballistic missiles—the Trident missile. In July 1980, President Carter 
agreed to sell the United Kingdom the Trident C4 missile. According to Francis 
Pym, then the Secretary of State for Defense, the agreement to buy Trident was 
comparable to the Nassau Agreement of 1962: 
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The Polaris force as a whole is entirely owned by the United 
Kingdom, and final decisions on its operational use rest with Her 
Majesty’s Government alone; but it is committed to NATO and 
targeted in accordance with Alliance policy and strategic concepts 
under plans made by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), save where Britain’s supreme national interests 
otherwise require. The new Trident force will be acquired, 
committed and operated on the same basis.184 
In 1981, shortly after agreeing to buy the C4 missile, British Prime Minister 
Thatcher and Parliament recognized the benefits of acquiring the newer, more 
advanced Trident D5 missile instead.185 President Reagan accelerated the 
procurement schedule of the Trident II (D5) program in October 1981.186 Not only 
was Britain’s decision to adopt the Trident D5 missile based on obtaining the 
upgraded capability compared to the C4, but also to facilitate “the retention of 
commonality with the United States Navy.”187 The United Kingdom desired to 
retain commonality with the United States in order to maintain its close nuclear 
relationship with Washington as well as to save time and money. Development of 
a comparable nuclear weapons delivery system would be more costly for the 
United Kingdom than to purchase SLBMs from the United States. According to 
the March 1982 Open Government document, 
The costs and technical risks associated with such programmes to 
the United Kingdom, acting alone, are impossible to quantify so far 
ahead, but would be high by any standards. Again our experience 
with the Chevaline system shows just how expensive the resolution 
of problems in this field by programmes unique to the United 
Kingdom can be. If the United Kingdom were to adopt the Trident 
D5 rather than the Trident C4 missile for its next generation 
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SSBNs, we would expect to retain commonality with the United 
States system throughout its projected service life.188  
The Trident D5 missile presented greater capability than its predecessor, 
Polaris. Trident D5 missiles were able to carry 14 warheads189 and to engage 
multiple targets simultaneously, thanks to what the United States called MIRV 
(multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). Moreover, Trident D5 
missiles could engage targets up to 6,000 nautical miles away.190 According to 
Lawrence Freedman, the Polaris missile beginning in the 1960s carried “the 
Polaris A-3 warhead, which split up in a shotgun effect into three re-entry 
vehicles… but each separate warhead was unguided. However, it was accepted 
that mobility and multiple warheads came at the expense of accuracy.”191 MIRV 
missiles were estimated to remain effective and relevant despite technological 
improvements in the Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems.192  
Critics of the Trident II (D5) missiles argued that, despite Britain’s efforts to 
highlight the independence of its nuclear deterrent, its relationship with the 
United States and reliance on U.S.-made missiles conveyed a picture of 
dependence. Kevin Harrison argued that it solidified “Britain’s continuing 
dependence on American weapons systems, designed to meet American 
strategic needs.”193 In addition, Kevin Harrison argued that the costs associated 
with continuing the nuclear deterrent left “Britain with the worst of all possible  
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worlds: an irrelevant, barely minimal nuclear deterrent and crumbling 
conventional forces lowering the nuclear threshold, making the use of the 
deterrent more likely.”194 
The British believed that building the submarines and warheads 
themselves conveyed a sense of independence in the acquisition of the nuclear 
platform and reinforced the domestic nuclear maritime infrastructure. The 
transition to Trident included the same allocation of effort and responsibility as 
with the Polaris submarines—the United Kingdom built the Trident submarines 
and the nuclear warheads, while the United States supplied the missiles. In 
addition, command and control over the British nuclear submarines and their 
armaments remained solely in the hands of the British government.  
Although the British nuclear strategy of CASD did not change with the 
commissioning of a fleet of four Trident submarines, the targeting and 
employment strategy of the Trident missiles required revision due to the 
technological advancements. In the post-Cold War context of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) proliferation to regional powers, the British government 
identified limited employment options against such powers. For example, in 
March 2002, Geoff Hoon, then Secretary of State for Defence, said: 
They can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we 
would be willing to use our nuclear weapons. What I cannot be 
absolutely confident about is whether that would be sufficient to 
deter them from using a weapon of mass destruction in the first 
place.195 
Bomber aircraft remained in service alongside SLBMs until 1998, when all 
WE177 gravity bomb warheads were decommissioned.196 Once the bombers 
were removed from service, the entirety of the nuclear deterrent was placed on 
                                            
194 Ibid. 
195 Geoff Hoon, House of Commons, Select Committee on Defence, examination of 
witnesses, questions 236 and 237, March 20, 2002, www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmdfence/644/2032008.htm. 
196 David S. Yost, “New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France, and the United 
States,” International Affairs 81, no.1 (2005): 1. 
 46 
Britain’s four Trident submarines—both the strategic and sub-strategic 
missions.197 For the first time in Britain’s history, the RAF no longer played a 
nuclear deterrent role.198 Des Browne, then the Secretary of State for Defence, 
announced in 2002 that the British government would no longer use the term 
“sub-strategic”:  
The UK has in fact never sought to use our nuclear weapons as a 
means of provoking or coercing others. We will never do so. Nor 
are our weapons intended or designed for military use during 
conflict. Indeed, we have deliberately chosen to stop using the term 
‘sub-strategic Trident’, applied previously to a possible limited use 
of our weapons. I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm that 
the UK would only consider using nuclear weapons in the most 
extreme situations of self-defence.199 
According to the “Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995,” 
We announced last year that we would not develop a new air-
launched nuclear system to replace the WE177 bomb but instead 
would rely on the flexibility of the Trident system to fulfill the sub-
strategic as well as the strategic nuclear deterrent role in the longer 
term. The corollary is that we do not expect to develop a new 
nuclear weapon system any earlier than would be required to 
replace Trident.200 
The technological advances of Trident enabled it to assume complete 
responsibility for all of Britain’s nuclear weapons needs, and it continues to do so 
today. Despite the ever changing global security environment, the United 
Kingdom has continued to retain its nuclear deterrent capability through the fleet 
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of four submarines as an insurance policy for an uncertain future.201 Britain is 
again faced with the decision for the future of its nuclear deterrent. London has 
made preliminary decisions to replace its obsolescent Trident fleet with a new 
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V. INSURANCE: BRITAIN’S RATIONALE FOR NUCLEAR 
DETERRENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Prime Minister David Cameron stated in a speech commemorating the 
100th patrol of Britain’s Trident-missile-equipped submarines, “Every hour of 
every day, one of these submarines is patrolling the oceans—silent and invisible, 
armed and alert, our ultimate insurance against nuclear attack.”203 His words 
emphasize Britain’s justification for the post-Cold War retention of its nuclear 
weapons: insurance. According to Cameron, “It is an insurance policy that the 
United Kingdom cannot do without.”204  
The Soviet nuclear threat during the Cold War justified paying the high 
price of nuclear deterrence. It has proven more difficult to justify maintaining a 
nuclear deterrent without a specific nuclear threat. It is also challenging to 
ascertain whether Britain’s nuclear deterrence capabilities have prevented an 
invasion or attack—simply put, it appears that deterrence works until it doesn’t. 
Britain has consistently endorsed maintaining a continuous at-sea deterrence 
(CASD) policy instead of relying exclusively on U.S. extended deterrence or 
disarming.205 In Malcolm Chalmers’s words,  
The strategic case for the UK nuclear force as a hedge against 
uncertainty is not only about potential enemies. It is also rooted in a 
concern that, when the chips are down, the UK might find itself 
without friends at precisely the moment when it needed them most. 
That is why the central rationale for the UK’s nuclear force has 
always been a national, rather than an alliance, one.206 
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The evaluation of why Britain feels the need to retain nuclear weapons 
capability peels back the curtain on its assessment of future threats and of the 
utility of nuclear deterrence in countering potential threats. 
The British government does not pretend to have all of the answers. Its 
policy to retain nuclear weapons capability reflects its recognition of the 
uncertainty that lies ahead.207 According to the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review in 2010, the British government acknowledges,  
No state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten 
the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the 
possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-
emerge—a state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use of its 
capabilities could change relatively quickly, and while we will 
continue to work internationally to enhance mutual trust and 
security, we cannot rule out a major shift in the international 
security situation which would put us under grave threat.208  
Nuclear weapons are viewed as an insurance policy against potential 
aggressors who may wish to harm or coerce Britain with nuclear weapons.209 
The British Parliament and Ministry of Defense have published a series of 
documents explaining the United Kingdom’s nuclear policy, future strategic 
challenges, nuclear delivery platform alternatives, etc.  
On July 16, 2013, the British government published the Trident 
Alternatives Review, which analyzed alternative nuclear delivery platforms. 
Although the government published the review, it is not considered government 
policy because the document was prepared at the request of the Liberal 
Democrats, one of the two parties in the governing coalition in Parliament.210   
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The Trident Alternatives Review (TAR) sought to analyze whether other 
nuclear delivery platforms could be considered a credible deterrent and be more 
cost effective, whether the ballistic missile submarine deterrent should be 
modified (e.g., with cruise missiles), and whether a ballistic missile submarine 
deterrent force would be credible without the CASD strategy.211 The Trident 
Alternatives Review states, however, that it does not “offer recommendations” or 
advocate one platform or strategy above another.212  
Some of the “shortlist”213 submarine alternatives that the Trident 
Alternatives Review discusses are aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and land-
based missile silos.214 Other alternatives were also considered but dismissed in 
favor of more credible or more feasible options.215 Ballistic missiles, gravity 
bombs and many variations of cruise missiles were assessed as alternatives for 
the current SLBM delivery system.216  
The Trident Alternatives Review found that cruise missile alternative 
platforms, including aircraft options, would be less expensive throughout their 
service lives than a 3 or 4 boat fleet of Trident SSBNs. The time that would be 
required to develop and build the cruise missiles, however, would necessitate 
that a subsequent fleet of submarines be constructed to fill the gap between the 
ended service life of the previous generation of Trident submarines and the date 
the cruise missiles would be available for service. To not fill the gap would mean 
that the United Kingdom would be altogether without a nuclear deterrent and 
would have to rely on the protection of the United States and France. The costs 
required to do both—to build a new fleet of submarines and develop and procure 
cruise missiles—would put the budget over what would be required to build a 
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subsequent generation of submarines alone. Therefore, the Review found that 
constructing a nuclear deterrent comparable to the current one would be the 
most credible and cost-effective option.217 
Some may ask why the Liberal Democrats requested an alternatives 
review report when alternative platforms had already been analyzed in the 2006 
White Paper. The answer to this question resides in the differences in what each 
report considered adequate platform capabilities and a minimum deterrent. The 
TAR reduced the requirements of the platform to “A minimum nuclear deterrent 
capability that, during a crisis, is able to deliver at short notice a nuclear strike 
against a range of targets at an appropriate scale and with very high confidence.” 
In contrast, in the 2006 white paper’s assessment, according to Malcolm 
Chalmers, “all options were compared against a fixed, and ambitious, 
requirement (for example, in relation to continuous availability).”218 The 2006 
White Paper’s guideline for a minimum deterrent was based on the assumption 
that the deterrent would be continuously operating. The TAR only required, 
however, that the nuclear platform be available during a crisis.219 
Despite ambitious nuclear force modernization and evidence of nuclear 
proliferation risks in much of Eurasia,220 public support in Britain for the current 
policy of nuclear deterrence has been characterized as “lukewarm.”221 Critics of 
Britain’s nuclear weapons program argue that nuclear weapons are no longer 
needed in the current security environment since the end of the Cold War.222 
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Many believe that nuclear weapons are inhumane due to their immense 
destructive power and their capacity to cause the indiscriminate annihilation of 
combatants and noncombatants alike.  
In addition, critics observe, it is unclear how nuclear weapons could be 
utilized to deter non-state actors, such as terrorists.223 The Nuclear Information 
Service, a nuclear disarmament advocacy group based in the United Kingdom, 
has asserted, “Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to terrorists. Nuclear weapons 
based in the UK are the easier target and pose a real risk of terrorist attack that 
should be eliminated if we are serious about the security of citizens in the UK.”224 
It is precisely because nuclear weapons could be an attractive target of terrorist 
attacks that the United Kingdom and other responsible nuclear weapons states 
have invested so much in protecting them. 
Although Britain retains its independent nuclear deterrent (independent 
meaning that Britain has full control and sole launching authority), Britain cannot 
ensure its security with its capabilities alone. The United Kingdom’s nuclear 
forces are most relevant as part of NATO’s architecture of deterrence 
capabilities. According to an expert British observer,  
To be brutally honest, the UK rationale depends on the continuing 
NATO context of US extended deterrence. Operating 
independently, the UK nuclear force strengthens difficulties in the 
mind of a potential aggressor. It’s not really based on a scenario of 
Britain alone in the world. It’s a more subtle justification. What we 
have really makes sense because it’s set in this context of US 
extended deterrence. The United Kingdom would be very worried if 
US extended deterrence appeared to be weakening.225 
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The United Kingdom’s alliance with the United States and other NATO 
allies strengthens and complicates the deterrence equation in relation to potential 
adversaries. Malcolm Chalmers, however, argues that the United Kingdom 
cannot always depend on its alliances for security and that its nuclear force was 
constructed to act as an independent deterrent: 
The sizing of the UK nuclear force is not driven by a requirement to 
provide a particular, or proportionate, contribution to joint US-UK 
capabilities. Moreover, while the UK places considerable weight on 
the importance of maintaining the US alliance, it does not assume 
that the US’s nuclear force would always be available (and seen to 
be available) for defence of its vital interests.226 
Nuclear deterrence insurance is not Britain’s only motivation to retain 
nuclear weapons, but it is its principal objective. The British government holds 
that Britain’s requirement for nuclear weapons is derived from its need for 
security in an uncertain future. Possible future threats that are highlighted in the 
2006 White Paper include proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to new 
states), state-sponsored terrorism, and the threat of chemical and biological 
weapons use by state and non-state actors.227 The British also justify their 
nuclear program through their commitment to the security of their NATO allies, 
their need to support domestic technical industries, and their collaborative 
partnership with the United States.228 The British government does not publicly 
emphasize possible ancillary motives such as maintaining nuclear prestige and 
global status, sustaining political influence, and obtaining benefits from the 
special relationship with the United States in nuclear and other matters. A Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI) report stated, “Indeed, it would be impossible for  
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a British government to argue in a public document that international status and 
influence were factors in maintaining and sustaining nuclear deterrent 
capability.”229 
Lee Willett, Head of the Maritime Studies Programme at RUSI, argued in 
his verbal testimony to the House of Commons on January 23, 2007, that the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons ensured that Britain would be a first-class global 
power despite the financial and political turmoil following World War II.230 Nuclear 
weapons continue to be a symbol of status as well as instruments of security.  
Although the government’s nuclear deterrence policy has not significantly 
changed since the end of the Cold War, it has downsized its nuclear arsenal and 
decreased submarine payloads in response to the changed environment since 
the end of the Cold War. The government in 2010 announced plans to further 
decrease its nuclear capability to the minimum deterrent necessary. The 
decisions included restricting the number of warheads onboard submarines from 
48 to 40, reducing the number of SLBMs onboard submarines, decreasing 
Britain’s operationally available warhead stockpile from “fewer than 160 to no 
more than 120,” and keeping its overall nuclear weapon stockpile to “no more 
than 180” warheads.231 
British deterrence policy has been intentionally ambiguous to keep 
potential adversaries uncertain as to how, when, and to what extent Britain would 
utilize nuclear weapons. Ambiguity can act to strengthen the deterrent. According 
to the International Security Information Service (ISIS), an independent research 
organization based in Brussels, 
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A degree of uncertainty or ambiguity about whether or not Britain 
might retaliate with nuclear weapons is deemed to strengthen 
deterrence. The logic …[is] that if the adversary knew precisely the 
circumstances in which Britain would use its nuclear weapons it 
could take action up to that point.232  
Uncertainty regarding how, when, and to what extent the government would 
utilize nuclear weapons is a significant factor in deterrence and therefore in 
justifying the retention of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. 
To disarm (that is, to abandon the national nuclear weapons posture) 
would also mean to cut the United Kingdom’s nuclear special relationship ties 
with the United States—a relationship from which the United Kingdom reaps 
many benefits. Britain may believe that the costs of sustaining its nuclear 
deterrent are worth the price if it receives intelligence, technology, and resources 
from the United States government that it might not have access to if it were not 
a nuclear-armed ally. Britain was the third country to become a nuclear power, 
and it is one of the two countries in the European Union (EU) that have national 
nuclear weapons programs. The British government may dislike the idea of 
disarming and allowing France to be the only nuclear power in the EU.233 It is 
important to add that “Deterrence and nuclear deterrence in particular have been 
among the topics implicitly excluded from the European Union’s European 
Security and Defence Policy.”234 Discussions of nuclear deterrence have, 
instead, been conducted within NATO. Britain maintains its commitment to 
NATO’s defense as one of its security priorities: 
Our obligations to our NATO Allies will continue to be among our 
highest priorities and we will continue to contribute to NATO’s 
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operations and its Command and Force Structures, to ensure that 
the Alliance is able to deliver a robust and credible response to 
existing and new security challenges.235 
To give up the status of a nuclear power would mean giving up influence in 
NATO, Europe, and the United States. 
In 1980, the British government was faced with the same decision that 
Parliament has faced in recent years: should Britain renew its nuclear delivery 
platforms or should it disarm? In 1980 and 2006, the government chose to retain 
its nuclear weapons capability. On both occasions, alternative nuclear weapons 
delivery platforms were evaluated as potential successor systems to the 
submarine fleet. In both cases, Britain decided that a fleet of four ballistic missile 
submarines would constitute the most effective solution. They are invulnerable to 
preemptive attack while on deployment and are able to launch nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles of extensive range. The four-boat policy is believed to ensure 
the highest level of readiness, in accordance with the CASD strategy.  
Prime Minister David Cameron has affirmed that the British independent 
nuclear deterrent is vital now and for the future security of the United Kingdom. 
Cameron stated, “My judgment is that it would be foolish to leave Britain 
defenceless against a continuing, and growing, nuclear threat.”236 The Final Gate 
decision is scheduled for 2016, when Parliament could vote to finalize plans for 
construction of the next generation of Trident submarines.237 If the Final Gate 
legislation passes, the first of the new fleet of submarines is estimated to enter 
service in 2024.238 
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